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ABSTRACT 
 
The basic objective of the paper is to identify the effectiveness of group lending based microfinance 
programme operating through Primary Agricultural Credit Society to improve the economic 
condition among the rural participants in two blocks of Hooghly district in West Bengal. Here to do 
the impact study we have considered both Difference-in-Difference and First Difference Method 
with the help of longitudinal data and it is applied to minimize the possibility of selection bias during 
the time of drawing samples. It came out from field survey that very few marginal farmers had taken 
credit from their respective groups for agricultural purposes. Results reveal that there has been no 
significant impact of microfinance programme in terms of improvement of the outcome variables 
among the member households in spite of low interest rate charged on loans, high repayment rate 
within groups and small size of self-help groups. The reasons responsible are lack of skill-based 
training programmes for the members of groups and lack of marketing facilities to promote and sell 
the products produced by the members of self-help groups. The only positive aspect is the members 
can now protect themselves from the crunches of professional money lenders who charged exorbitant 
interest rates.  
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GROUP LENDING SCHEME OPERATING 
THROUGH PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
SOCIETY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
Introduction: 
Rural finance as defined by the World Bank is the provision of a range of financial services such 
as savings, credit payments and insurance to individuals both in farm and non-farm sector on a 
sustainable basis. It includes financing for agriculture and agro processing sector. Agricultural 
finance is defined as a subset of rural finance dedicated to financing agriculture related activities. 
Microfinance is the provision of financial services for poor and low-income people and covers 
the lower ends of both rural and agricultural finance.  Co-operative credit societies always have a 
very important role to play in Indian financial system especially in the sphere of rural finance. 
The cooperative movement which is the largest socio economic movement in the world, has 
contributed significantly to the alleviation of poverty, creation of productive employment as well 
as the enhancement of social integration in the country. The cooperative sector is mainly 
concerned with agricultural credit, marketing of agricultural products and distribution of 
fertilizers and pesticides and other essential commodities. The cooperative banking system has a 
three-tier structure providing short-term, medium-term and long-term agricultural credit with 
Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS) at the village level, the Central Cooperative Banks 
at the district level and the State Cooperative Banks at the state level. The formation, registration, 
operation and winding up of cooperatives are governed by state laws and regulations. Agriculture 
credit for the small and marginal farmers can be treated as one form of micro credit because the 
size of credit disbursed through PACS is a function of the size of land owned by the borrower. 
Though the Agriculture Credit Review Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. A.K.Khusro in 
its historic report of 1989 propagated the concept of micro credit delivery through the self-help 
groups as a part of business development programme of the Primary Agricultural Credit 
Societies, the SHG concept did not gain much ground in the cooperative sector in India. The 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development model initiated in 1992 did not envisage 
implementation of SHG in the cooperative sector through PACS. In 1995 the State Government 
permitted the PACS of West Bengal to enroll the self-help groups as members of PACS. The 
Hooghly District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. one of the leading District Central Cooperative 
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Banks in West Bengal started motivating the rural poor and established six groups in the month 
of January 1996. Since then the Bank has enormously increased the number of self-help groups 
and credit linkage thereof. The basic objective of the paper is to investigate how effective this 
joint liability microfinance programmes through Primary Agriculture Credit Societies is in 
improving economic condition of the rural participants. 
Group Lending Programme under PACS through formation of Self-Help-Group.  
The group approach delegates the entire financial process to the group rather than the financial 
institutions, here PACS. These groups are in turn linked to a microfinance institution for 
sourcing of additional funds as well as depositing their savings. “Group liability” refers to the 
terms of the actual contract whereby individuals are both borrowers and simultaneously 
guarantors of other clients’ loans (Gine and Karlan, 2006). A self-help group (SHG) is a small, 
economically homogenous and affinity group of the rural poor, voluntarily coming together to 
save small amount of money regularly, provide collateral free loans with terms decided by the 
groups and have collective decision-making. Under the cooperative-SHG linkage programme, 
groups can be formed directly by the different branches of Cooperative Banks or via PACS. 
Harper, Berkhof and Ramakrishna (2003) in their study found out that the more successful a 
DCCB is at SHG linkage, the higher the proportion of SHGs linked to the PACS. The process of 
forming groups by PACS and the different branches of DCCBs are same and that is narrated 
below. 
• A locality is chosen and the target group is selected. The women of the chosen locality 
particularly belonging to poor families are the target group. 
 The target group is addressed by the staff from PACS or by employees of branches of 
DCCBs who are entrusted with the task of initiating the movement along with officers 
from NABARD and DCCB. Sensitization camps and motivation programmes are 
organized for the target group.  
 The target group self-select their members (at least five and not exceeding fifteen) having 
same economic status to form a self-help group. 
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 The members first decide a name for the group which is a unanimous decision by all the 
members of the group in the first meeting.  
 After the group name is decided, a leader and a deputy leader are selected from among 
the members. Usually a literate member is selected as the leader. If all members in a 
group are illiterate, the SHG supervisor helps them to maintain accounts and keep record 
of meetings.   
 The amount to be deposited as savings on monthly basis is decided by the members of the 
group which varies from Rs. 10 to Rs. 50. The money must be given by the 10th of every 
month to the leader of the group 
 After the first month’s collection the leader opens an account with the PACS or with the 
branch in the name of the group and deposits the amount collected from the members of 
the group. A passbook is issued in the name of the group. The money is deposited by the 
10th of every month in the account with the society. The group deposit earns interest 
which is currently 4% per annum. 
 The group has to maintain the following documents- a Minutes Book, a Cash Book, a 
deposit ledger and a loan ledger. 
 The group has to save for six months. The group is constantly monitored by the SHG 
supervisor, an employee of PACS during these six months. 
 Several training programmes are arranged by PACS for the target group to create self 
employment opportunities for the target group. The different types of training 
programmes are mushroom cultivation, production of vermi compost, tailoring, poultry 
etc. Non-government organizations do not play any role in the nurturing of SHGs in these 
two blocks.   
 After six months the group becomes eligible for loan facilities. The group is sanctioned 
four times the amount deposited as loan. The loan is granted in the name of the group 
after which the loan is distributed among the members either depending on the need or 
equally which again depends on the unanimous decision of the group members. The loan 
is repaid to the group within a stipulated time period and along with an interest rate 
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decided by the members of the group, usually 12% per annum. There are different 
reasons for which a group member may take a loan. Loans can be both for consumption 
as well as production purposes. Productive loans can be for self employment or for 
agriculture purposes. 
 The loan is repaid by the members to the group which in turn is repaid to the PACS or the 
branch. The branch or the PACS charge some interest rate which again differs from one 
PACS to the other. The repayment period for the group is decided by the group 
unanimously. The repayment period for the branch or PACS is decided by the respective 
agencies. There is a maximum time limit within which the loan must be repaid to the 
agencies. It is observed that the group members are very eager to repay the loan in order 
to avail of the successive loan facilities. 
So we can identify that the Self-Help Groups formed under PACS has two important features: (i) 
the group size is small and (ii) the rate of interest charged against credit is comparatively low. 
Larger size of group can lead to management problems and sometimes lengthens the time that 
members have to wait to get their first credit. But these groups are free from these hindrances 
because the average number of members of each group is sixi. Besides that the rate of interest 
charged against credit is comparatively low if we compare that with other microfinance system 
like government supported SGSY schemeii.   
Overview of Literature: 
The findings by Hulme and Mosley (1996) stated that poor households do not benefit from 
microfinance; it is only non-poor borrowers (with income above poverty lines) who can do well 
with microfinance and enjoy sizeable positive impacts. Morduch (1998) in his study established 
that the households served by the microfinance programmes do substantially better than control 
households. At the same time, no evidence was found to support claims that the programmes 
increase consumption levels or increase educational enrolments for children relative to levels in 
control villages. He concluded that membership does little to reduce poverty, it may however 
reduce vulnerability. Coleman (1999) found no significant impact of access to microcredit on 
improving household wealth. Khandker (2001) in his study confirmed that programmes make a 
difference to poor participants by raising per capita income and consumption as well as 
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household net worth, thereby increasing the probability that the programme participants lift 
themselves out of poverty. Coleman (2006) found that the insignificance was limited to general 
beneficiaries and that a positive impact was found among committee members who received 
access to financing. Asian Development Bank (2007) in their study of three countries indicated 
that the microfinance projects had positive effects on the status of women particularly in the 
household like greater role in household generation of cash, greater involvement in making 
major expenditure decisions and generating cash savings, ability to generate more income on 
their own and greater role in business decision making, acquisition of more skills and expanding 
their network of friends and support system and increased acquisition of assets. Bebezuk and 
Haimovich (2007) found that credit increased labour income in a statistically and economically 
significant manner. The impact was sensitive to the size of the loan. Roodman and Morduch 
(2009) established that microcredit is effective in reducing poverty. Kondo, Orbeta, Dingiong 
and Infantado (2008) found out that the impact of microfinance programme on per capita 
income, total expenditures and food expenditure is only slightly significant but with regressive 
features. This is in sharp contrast to the other studies which indicated that the majority of 
microfinance programme clients are poor. Rafiq, Rahman and Momen (2009) in their findings 
argue that microcredit is more effective for relatively wealthier borrowers compared to non-
wealthy borrowers. The reasons for ineffectiveness of microfinance programme through joint 
liability loan contract system to reduce poverty have been identified by many researchers 
through their findings. The MIT study by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2009) found 
no impact on measures of health, education, or women’s decision-making among the slum 
dwellers in the city of Hyderabad, India. Similarly, the study by Dean and Zinman (2009), which 
measured the probability of being below the poverty line and quality of food that people ate, 
found no discernible effects. Mahajan (2005) stated that microcredit is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for micro-enterprise promotion. Pollin (2007) stated that micro enterprises 
run by poor people cannot be broadly successful simply because they have increased 
opportunities to borrow money. For large number of micro enterprises to be successful, they also 
need access to decent roads and affordable means of moving their products to markets. They 
need marketing support to reach customers.  
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Methodology:  
The sample is drawn from Hooghly district of West Bengal. Hooghly has been selected because 
it has the maximum number of self-help groups provided with bank loan which are formed by 
PACS and the amount of loan disbursed to these groups by the District Central Cooperative 
Bank is also the largest (Progress of SHG –Bank Linkage in India 2005-06, NABARD). The role 
of the Hooghly District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. (HDCCB) in microfinance is also 
significant compared to the Cooperative Banks of other districts and has been considered as the 
role model for many districts and states. There were 8419 savings-linked SHGs out of which 
8395 were under PACS of HDCCB as on 31.03.03. The total number of female SHGs was 8242. 
The total number of credit-linked SHGs was 5296 out of which 5087 were female SHGs. The 
amount of savings deposit mobilized by SHGs was Rs. 214.43 lakhs and the amount of loan 
disbursed was Rs. 666.67 lakhs. At the end of that financial year it was estimated that the 
repayment rate of borrowing under joint liability was 98%. (Annual Report of Hooghly District 
Central Cooperative Bank Ltd.). Out of the eighteen blocks in Hooghly, only two blocks have 
been selected for the survey randomly and these two sample blocks are (i) Chinsurah-Mogra and 
(ii) Tarakeshwar. Both the blocks have tribal based communities with a considerable percentage 
of people lying below the poverty line. Chinsurah-Mogra has two PACS affiliated to Hooghly 
DCCB Ltd - Digsui Union Large Sized Primary Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. and 
Talandu Sech ‘O’ Samabyay Unnayan Samiti Ltd. The former is the oldest. This is also another 
reason for choosing Chinsurah-Mogra. This society was formed on 5th March 1957 at Digsui 
catering to the needs of 13 villages – Digsui, Khalsi, Gannegarh, Bagri, Daharchakulai, 
Mamudpur, Kabirhati, Naksha, Fatehpur, Taragun, Champarui, Aashphal and Rajarambati. Since 
1996, SHG loan is also being provided by the society. The latter was formed on 26.12.73. It 
covers two villages – Talandu and Bharatpur. SHG loan has been introduced in this society since 
1998. In Tarakeshwar there are eighteen PACS out of which one is chosen randomly and it is 
known as Vivekananda Samabyay Krishi Unnayan Samiti Ltd. Incidentally it has the maximum 
number of savings-linked and credit-linked groups. This society was formed on 17th September 
1977. It covers five villages – Kanaria, Mohonbati, Nacchhipur, Tullyan and Champadanga. The 
loan disbursed through SHGs was utilized both for agricultural purpose as well as for other 
purposes like consumption, construction and repair, business etc. But the information on the 
amount of loan used for agricultural purpose out of the total SHG loan is not available. Other 
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loan included education and medical loan. Similarly, Talandu Sech ‘O’ Samabyay Unnayan 
Samiti Ltd. also disburses term loan and SHG loan.  The different types of loan disbursed by 
Vivekananda Samabyay Krishi Unnayan Samiti Ltd. were pledge loan and SHG loan along with 
crop loan. The rate of recovery varied between 80% and 90% for all the three PACS in the 
financial year which ended in 2003. 
As our basic objective is to do impact study, during the time of drawing samples we divided the 
sample into two groups i.e. treatment group (the group consists of the households who have 
formed SHG under PACS) and control group or reference group. For joint liability loan contract 
system, all the groups that were formed in 2004 (which is here considered as base period i.e. tth 
period) were used as the sample as not too many groups were formed during this year. Most of 
the members of each group were included in the sample. The total number of groups formed 
during this year in the three PACS was 47. We were very careful during the time of selecting the 
control group. Here the sample households belonging to control group are chosen from the same 
locality from where the sample households belong to treatment group is chosen. But we are sure 
that the sample respondents belonging to control group are not getting any indirect benefit from 
the sample respondents belonging to treatment group. Besides that the rural households where 
one member at one side is a direct member of PACS and another member mainly female is a 
member of SHG are left out during the time of drawing samples. To minimize the problem of 
sample selection bias we here depend on longitudinal data. So the survey was carried out twice 
in order to determine the impact of microfinance programme on the treatment group and to 
evaluate whether there has been any economic improvement among the members of self-help 
groups as compared to the control group within the concerned time period. The first survey 
period was from August to November in 2005-06 to get the socio-economic information of the 
sample respondents during September to December, 2004 and the second survey period was 
from September to December in 2008iii. The periods were chosen to minimize the recall period 
of each respondent and to get direct observation as much as possible. After the sample 
households were selected the socio economic conditions were studied with the help of a well 
framed detailed questionnaire in order to determine the impact of microfinance in improving 
economic conditions among the participants. In our sample, the rural households of the same 
villages had the option of either joining any of the self-help groups or stay away from them. Thus 
the sample has two categories: 
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1. Individuals who have taken membership of self-help group in the tth period and plans to 
take credit in future when required from her respective group under joint liability loan 
contract. These individuals in our paper belong to Treatment Group. 
2. Individuals, from almost identical socio-economic background who are not members of 
joint liability loan contract system in the tth period but have the eligibility to join any of 
the groups. These sample respondents belong to control group. 
The total sample size is 376 out of which the treatment group has 276 individuals and the control 
group has 100 individuals. As the group members are indirectly attached with PACS, initially we 
have to identify the size of land holdings of the sample households belonging to treatment as 
well as control group which is shown in Table-1.  
Table -1: Distribution of the sample respondents in terms of the size of land ownership  
Size of Land 
(Acres) 
Treatment Group Control Group 
2004:(tth period) 2008: (t+1)th period 2004 2008 
No Land 144 144 45 45 
< 1 acre 90 90 19 19 
1 acre to 2.5 
acres 
40 40 36 36 
Greater than 
2.5 acres  
2 2 0 0 
Total 276 276 100 100 
Source: Collected through field survey.  
According to Land Ceiling Legislation marginal farmers are those whose ownership of land 
holdings is not more than 2.5 acres. It is observed that 130 sample households belonging to 
treatment group are marginal farmers both in tth and in (t+1)th period. They have the eligibility of 
taking credit directly from PACS (under individual liability loan contract) but still they prefer 
their wives to join the group and become a member of the group under PACS. The main reason 
is that under direct membership of PACS a rural household can only get credit for agricultural 
purposes but under joint liability system a member household can get credit from their respective 
groups not only for agricultural purposes but also for non-agricultural purposes like house 
repairing, health, and sometimes purely for consumption purposes.    
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Impact assessment among the sample respondents on the basis of longitudinal data: 
Pooled cross section can be very useful for evaluating the impact of a certain event or policy. In 
our survey the data arises from a natural experiment. A natural experiment occurs when some 
exogenous event like any change in government policy can possibly change the socio-economic 
environment of the individuals or households. This natural experiment always has a control 
group which is not affected by the policy changes and a treatment group which is thought to be 
affected by the policy changes. In order to control for systematic differences between the control 
and treatment group we need two years data, one just before the implementation of the policy 
and one after the change. With in the framework of a natural experiment the effect of a change in 
economic policy is most often assessed with the help of an estimator called difference-in-
difference estimator. To get the estimate we shall have to depend on longitudinal data. To collect 
the longitudinal data we attempt to follow the same households or individuals across time. Let 
the two time periods be denoted as tth period and (t+1)th time period. These years are not adjacent 
i.e. tth period corresponds to 2004 and (t+1)th to 2008 in which year the actual impact have been 
measured. Thus our sample is usefully broken down into four groups, (i) the control group before 
the change, (ii) the control group after the change, (iii) the treatment group before the change and 
(iv)  the treatment group after the change. In this ‘before versus after’ comparison the time gap 
taken here is four years. We can call ‘C’ as control group and ‘T’ as the treatment group. DT 
here is treated as dummy variable and equal to 1 for those in the treatment group ‘T’ and ‘zero’ 
for control group. We also consider D2 as the dummy variable for the second time period. So the 
equations of our interest are  
y୧୲ ൌ α଴ ൅ αଵD2 ൅ αଶDT ൅ αଷD2DT ൅ αସDRatio୧୲ ൅ αହCRINGACT୧ ൅ α଺CRNIGACT୧
൅ u୧୲ … … … … … … … … … … … … … ሺ1ሻ 
MPCE୧୲ ൌ α଴ ൅ αଵD2 ൅ αଶDT ൅ αଷD2DT ൅ αସDRatio୧୲ ൅ αହCRINGACT୧ ൅ α଺CRNIGACT୧
൅ α଻OUTMCR ൅ u୧୲ … … … … … … … … … … … … … ሺ2ሻ 
Here two outcome variables of interest are yit which denotes the average monthly income of the 
ith sample household in the tth period and MPCEit is Monthly adult equivalentiv per-capita 
consumption expenditure of the ith sample household in the tth period. During the time of 
calculating yit we have to consider net income from land and income from other sources like 
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income as an agricultural labourers as well as a non-agricultural labourer (reference period is one 
year), earnings from selling milk products, working in potato stores, small business like grocery 
shop, cycle repairing shop, tea stalls, tailoring, wage income as labourers after being engaged in 
different activities as masons, carpenters, trolley drivers, providing tuitions and working in small 
firms (reference period is one month). It also includes women folks working as maids, cooks in 
primary school for mid-day meals and Integrated Child Development Scheme workers. It 
includes income earned from National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme under NREGA Act 
which promises to provide total 100 days of employment in a financial year to adult members of 
any rural household willing to do unskilled manual work at the statutory minimum wage. This 
income has been considered only for the (t+1) th periodv. After calculating the annual income 
where necessary (particularly for farm income and income from NREGA) we have converted 
that in to average monthly income. If in a sample household we observe more than one earning 
member or an earning member is involved more than one occupations then initially we have 
converted the earning(s) of each member in terms of monthly income and then added the average 
monthly income of each earning member to get yit the average monthly income of the ith sample 
household either belongs to treatment group or to control group in the tth period. Similarly we 
can get the value of average monthly income of the sample household’s income in the (t+1)th 
period in current price. But we have to convert that average monthly income in constant term 
considering 2004-05 as the base year on the basis of consumer’s price index of the agricultural 
labourers of West Bengal. During the time of calculating monthly per-capita consumption 
expenditure of the sample household i.e. MPCE we initially have to subtract average monthly 
savings and average amount spent for loan repayment per month if required from calculated 
average monthly income to get total monthly consumption expenditure of that sample household. 
Dividing that by adult equivalent family members we can get MPCE of the ith household.   
Among the explanatory variables in both the equations, DRatioit is the dependency ratio of the ith 
household in the tth period. It is the ratio between total number of adult equivalent family 
members and total number of adult equivalent earning member(s). DRatioi may change over time 
if the participant of the microcredit programme becomes an earning member in the second period 
after taking credit from her respective group and utilize that for any income generating activity. 
CRINGACTi is total size of credit taken by the sample members for income generating activity 
between the concerned time periods. Loans taken for cultivation, health, son’s/ husband’s 
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business like tea stall, grocery shop, tailoring, cycle garage etc. and self-employment are here 
considered as credit taken for Income generating activity. Expenditure on health after taking 
credit from her respective group is here considered as investment of the member for income 
generating activity because health is an asset for an individual as most of the earning members of 
the sample households work in unorganized sector. In India out of pocket individual medical 
expenditure is very high. Therefore loans through joint liability loan contract system provide 
much relief to the rural poor because they do not have health insurance. Easy loans available for 
health purposes at low rate of interest through joint liability loan contract system helps the 
member households to be fit after proper treatment which ultimately help them to join her(his) 
economic activity within a very short period. Better the health better will be the working 
capability of the individual and hence more will be scope of earning. As we here consider only 
two time periods, total size of credit taken by the member households between the concerned 
time period for income generating activity are accommodated in the second time period.  Same 
thing also happens for CRNIGACTi i.e. size of microcredit taken by the member households for 
non-income generating activities. Loan taken for consumption, marriage, housing, education are 
here treated as non-income generating activity. Credit taken from respective groups for non-
income generating activity indirectly help the participants to raise their income as well as 
consumption because that prevents them to fall in to debt trap after taking credit from informal 
sources with high rate of interest. Table-2 shows the distribution of the borrowers belonging to 
treatment group who took credit from their respective groups either for income generating 
activity mainly cultivation or for non-income generating activity within the concerned time 
period.  
       Table-2: Distribution of the sample households for purposes of taking credit. 
Purpose of Borrowing  Number of Respondents took credit  
between 2004-2008 
1. Income Generating 
Activity 
 
(i)  Cultivation 75 
(ii) Self-Employment 05 
(iii) Husband’s/ Son’s 33 
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business 
(iv)   Health  20 
Total Number of Households 
took  microcredit from their 
respective group for different 
Income Generating Activities 
133 
2. Non-Income Generating 
Activities 
 
(i) Daily Expenses 55 
(ii) Education 14 
(iii) Housing 28 
Total Number of Households 
taken microcredit from their 
respective group for different 
Non-Income Generating 
Activities 
97 
Souce: Data collected from field survey. 
So it comes out that only 75 out of total 276 sample households took microcredit for cultivation 
under joint liability systemvi. No question of the existence of multi-co linearity in the above two 
models and the Pearson Correlation Coefficient between CRINGACT and CRNINGACT is .12 
and that is statistically insignificantvii. In the second equation we incorporate another dummy 
variable OUTMCR i.e. whether the participant has any outstanding microcredit in the second 
time period. It is ‘1’ if the participant has any outstanding microcredit in the second time period 
and ‘0’ otherwise. Actually if the participant has any outstanding microcredit in the second time 
period, then she has to pay a good amount for loan repayment and that can be done only through   
sacrificing present consumption which ultimately may affect MPCEi2.  
Here α3 measures the effect of the policy. Without other factors, in the regression ߙଷෞ is the 
difference-in difference estimator. It is also called average treatment effect because it measures 
the effect of the ‘treatment’ or policy on yit or MPCEit..  In the first model ߙଷෞ represents ሼሺyଶTതതതത െ
yଵTതതതത ሻ െ ሺyଶCതതതത െ yଵCതതതത ሻ} and in the second model it represents ሼሺMPCEଶTതതതതതതതതതതത െ MPCEଵTതതതതതതതതതത ሻ െ
ሺMPCEଶCതതതതതതതതതത െ MPCEଵCതതതതതതതതതത ሻሽ. The Table-3 gives the summary statistics of the explanatory variables 
both in tth and in (t+1)th period.  
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Table-3:  Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables: 
Table-3A: Of the Sample Respondents belong to Treatment Group 
Variables Base Year 2004 (tth time period) 2008 i.e. (t+1)th time period 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
y 2402.99 1750 2140.36 2847.29 2047 2307.19 
MPCE 671.64 535 512.4 728.5 563 557.5 
CRINGACT 0 0 0 3492.41 2000 12266.31 
CRNINGACT 0 0 0 1718.41 0 3025.19 
N 276   276   
 
Table-3B: Of the Sample Respondents Belong to Control Group 
Variables Base Year 2004 (tth time period) 2008 i.e. (t+1)th time period 
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
y 2842.07 1987.5 2362.06 2948.38 2142 2416.39 
MPCE 757.9 650 428.8 782.5 689 409.5 
CRINGACT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CRNINGACT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 100   100   
Source: Calculated from the data collected directly from field survey 
It has been checked that there is no significant difference between  yଵTതതതത  and yଵCതതതത   or 
MPCEଵTതതതതതതതതതത  and MPCEଵCതതതതതതതതതത . So we can mention that during the time of drawing samples from the 
control group there was little possibility of selection bias. Rather we can say that in the tth period 
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the economic condition of the sample households belonging to treatment group and that 
belonging to control group were almost homogeneous in nature.  It is also observed that average 
size of microcredit taken for income generating activity is comparatively higher if we compare 
that with non-income generating activity.  In the following Table-4 we put the regression results 
of Model-1 and Model-2 
Table-4: Regression results of the models mentioned in Equation (1) and Equation (2) 
Name of the Explanatory 
Variables 
Model-1: Outcome variable yit Model-2 : Outcome variable 
MPCEit 
Constant 277.565* 756.036* 
D2 146.911 21.806 
DT -550.485 -105.410 
D2DT -94.489 -5.139 
DRatio 22.074 1.772 
CRINGACT .03534* .00333 
CRNIGACT .224* .05091* 
OUTMCR  -86.641 
Rଶതതത ..054 .034 
*=> significant at 5% level.  
From the above table it is clear that αଷෞ i.e. the parameter estimate of D2DT is highly 
insignificant in both the models. So it comes out that there is no significant improvement in 
terms of average monthly income and monthly adult equivalent per capita consumption 
expenditure among the participants of microcredit programme between the concerned time 
periodsviii.  
Impact study through First Differenced Method: 
The impact study can also be analyzed on the basis of simplest kind of panel data of two periods. 
So we have taken the cross section data of a group of households both belonging to control group 
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and treatment group of two separate periods. Here t = 1 is for base line period and t = 2 for 
current period. We can write a model with a single observed explanatory variable as  
Y୧୲ ൌ β଴ ൅ δ଴d2t ൅ βଵX୧୲ ൅ a୧ ൅ u୧୲ when t ൌ 1 and 2 … … … … … … … . ሺ3ሻ 
In this model d2t is the dummy variable which equals to zero when t = 1 and one when t =2. 
Therefore the intercept at t = 1 is β଴ and at t =2 is β଴ ൅ δ଴. The explanatory variable ai is 
generally called unobserved effect. In this application the main reason for colleting panel data is 
to allow for the unobserved effect ai to be correlated with the explanatory variables. To remove 
the unobserved effect we can difference the data across the two years. If we subtract the second 
equation i.e. the situation when t =2 from the first equation when t = 1 we have the following 
equation 
ሺY୧ଶ െ Y୧ଵሻ ൌ δ଴ ൅ βଵሺX୧ଶ െ X୧ଵሻ ൅ ሺu୧ଶ െ u୧ଵሻ 
Or                                              ΔY୧ ൌ δ଴ ൅ βଵΔX୧ ൅ Δu୧ … … … … … … … … … … … . ሺ4ሻ 
Here ‘ࢤ’ denotes the changes from t = 1 to t = 2. The above equation is called the first 
differenced equation. It is just a single cross section equation. The most important is that ࢤui is 
un-correlated with ࢤXi.  To do the impact study we modify the above first differenced equation 
(4) in the following form 
Δy୧ ൌ δ଴ ൅ βଵDT ൅ βଶΔDRatio୧ ൅ βଷCRINGACT୧ ൅ βସCRNIGACT୧ ൅ Δu୧ … … . . ሺ5ሻ      and 
ΔMPCE୧ ൌ δ଴ ൅ βଵDT ൅ βଶΔDRatio୧ ൅ βଷCRINGACT୧ ൅ βସCRNIGACT୧ ൅ βହOUTCR ൅ Δu୧  (6) 
As two surveys had been done more than two years apart, the problem of selection bias during 
the time of choosing samples could be minimized. Here all household specific variables are not 
dropped out. Rather ΔDRatio୧ will be non-zero if either (i) the family size changes or (and) (ii) 
the number of earning member of the sample household changes. It is expected that after taking 
credit from the respective group the member herself or her son become new earning member of 
the family after being self-employed. The two explanatory variables CRNIGACT and 
CRNINGACT were zero at t=1. Total size of microcredit taken for income generating activity 
(CRNIGACT) and for non-income generating activity (CRNINGACT) taken by the self-help 
group members between the concerned time period are accommodated in t =2. Now to know the 
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impact of micro credit on the two outcome variables we mainly have to test the significance of 
βଵ, βଶ , βଷ and βସ respectively. The results of the two regressions of the equations of first 
differences are placed in the following Table-5: 
Table-5: Results of First Differenced Method where outcome variables are ∆yi and ∆MPCEi 
First Differenced Estimators Model-1          Δy୧ Model-2  ΔMPCE୧ 
δ଴෢ 130.814 21.217 
βଵ෢ 260.819 25.070 
βଶ෢ -260.830* -97.842* 
βଷ෢ -.001154 -.001876 
βସ෢ .03109 .008853 
βହ෢  3.382 
Rଶതതത .210 .067 
*=> Significant at 5% level. 
So from the above table it is clear that except ࢤDRatio no other explanatory variable related with 
microcredit play any significant role to improve Average monthly income or Monthly adult 
equivalent per-capita consumption expenditure of the participants of microcredit programme 
with in the concerned time period. The reason behind low value of Rଶതതത has already been explained 
previously. 
From the above tables it can be definitely said that there has been no economic improvement 
among the participants operating through joint liability loan contract system under Primary 
Agricultural Credit Society. The in-efficiency of micro credit programme under joint liability 
credit contract operated by Primary Agricultural Credit Society for economic improvement 
among the participants is reflected in Table-6 where it is observed that between the concerned 
time periods only little number of households belonging to treatment group is able to improve 
their economic conditions. Here according to the estimate of Planning Commission of India done 
by the expert group, the rural poverty line of West Bengal was Rs.445.38 MPCE in 2004-05. So 
we need not make any adjustment of MPCE of the sample respondents in the tth time period but 
some adjustments of both average monthly income and monthly per-capita consumption 
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expenditure of the entire sample respondents both belonging to treatment group and control 
group in 2008 was required. All are converted at constant term after considering 2004-05 as base 
year and adjustments were done on the basis of consumer’s price index of the agricultural 
labourers of West Bengal.   
Table-6: Distribution of the sample respondents in terms of MPCE both in tth and (t+1)th period 
Range of MPCE  Treatment Group Control Group 
tth period (t+1)th period tth period  (t+1)th period 
Below Rs.350   23   17 11 10 
Between Rs.350 
and Rs.445 
121 119 24 24 
Above Rs.445 132 140 65 66 
Total 276 276 100 100 
Source: Calculated by authors on the basis of data collected from field survey 
Table-6 shows that majority of the participants of microfinance programme under PACS are 
either lying above the poverty line or lying just below the poverty line in the tth period. The 
picture is almost identical even in the (t+1)th period. Now we will have to identify the reasons 
responsible for such a result in spite of the high repayment rate, low rate of interest charged from 
the members within the group and small size of groups where there is constant monitoring and 
peer pressure within the group. Let us now identify the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of 
microfinance programme through joint liability loan contract system operated by PACS in these 
two blocks from where the samples are drawn. The reasons behind such a result are explained 
below. 
Possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of microcredit programme running under PACS 
among the rural participants:   
Since farming is and will presumably continue to be the main economic activity of many rural 
people, a match between microfinance and the farmer’s need is required. The primary function of 
Primary Agriculture Credit Society is to provide agriculture credit through individual liability 
loan contract system. The Primary Agriculture Credit Society also plays an important role in the 
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joint liability loan contract system. The self-help groups are formed and nurtured by PACS 
which act as Micro Finance institutions (MFI). Yet the number of borrowings for cultivation 
from PACS through joint liability loan contract system is much less compared to other types of 
borrowings. The main reasons responsible for the mismatch between microfinance and farmer’s 
needs are stated below: 
1.  Actually more than half of the samples respondents belonging to treatment group possess 
no land and near about 33% of the respondent households are having less than 1 acre of 
land. Since the return from the land is risky and if not then the return is just sufficient for 
self-consumption, there will be problems for repayment if loans are taken for agriculture 
purpose. Therefore households majority of whom are marginal farmers prefer not to take 
loans for agriculture purpose from PACS through joint liability loan contract system 
because it involves peer pressure and group dynamics.  
2. Lack of initiative on the part of PACS for skill based training facilities:  There has not 
been much scope of training by the three PACS in the study. Talandu Sech ‘O’ Samabyay 
Unnayan Samiti Ltd. did not have any training programme for the poor women who have 
formed SHGs in the two villages to which it caters.  Digsui Union Large Sized Primary 
Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. had arranged for the training programme for 
mushroom cultivation in 2002. It was a three day programme, the cost of which was 
entirely borne by the respective PACS. Vivekananda Samabyay Krishi Unnayan Samiti 
Ltd. has provided training to its members of SHGs to produce vermi compost, produce 
‘sindoor’ and ‘alta’. It has also given them training about breeding of eggs of ducks 
which can be sold at a higher price. Some training was also provided for ‘zari work’. But 
these training were not on a large basis and all were provided much before 2004. After 
2004 no arrangements for training programmes have been made for the members of joint 
liability loan contract system. 
3. Lack of initiative on the part of members of SHGs for training facilities – The rural 
women are also not very motivated nor are they very much inclined to undertake any 
training programme because they say it is difficult for them to manage time after 
household chores to attend training programme. They remain very busy and prefer to 
remain very busy with their indoor activities and thus do not find any incentive to 
undertake any productive activity. 
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4. Lack of marketing facilities:  Even though there have been efforts by some rural women 
of these blocks on their own initiatives though not a large scale basis to undertake some 
productive activity like embroidery which is known by the name of ‘kantha stitching’, 
production of clay items but the major constraint they face is the problem of marketing 
their products because again no provision has been made for selling these products. 
Mushroom cultivation also faced the same problem and finally was stopped.  
5. Problem of funds and skill-based training programmes: The PACS complained of not 
getting proper financial assistance and assistance for skill-based training programmes 
from the higher authorities in spite of constant reminders to them. 
6. Availability of an alternative avenue for skill-based training programmes organized by 
Panchayats through District Rural Development Cell: The “Swarnajayanti Gramin 
Swarozgar Yojona”, a scheme of the government provides funds to the rural women at a 
subsidized rate along with training facilities which is acting as an incentive for them. 
Thus they are gradually losing interest in the SHG- Bank linkage programme and 
showing their preference for the government scheme.  
7. Loans for employment generating activities of rural women almost negligible: It is 
negligible because of lack of skill-based training programmes and absence of 
entrepreneurial skills among the members of self-help groups as compared to borrowings 
of other kinds. Loans have been taken for cultivation purpose i.e. to support family 
income. But since most of the members are marginal farmers, the income generated from 
cultivation did not show any significant change.    
Conclusions: 
The linkage model of the Microfinance programmes promoted by NABARD could be considered 
for replication towards extending more credit to marginal and sub-marginal farmers. Groups of 
marginal and sub-marginal farmers could act as joint liability groups serving as collected 
guarantor of loan extended by PACS. But it came out from field survey that not only the 
marginal and semi-marginal farmers even the landless rural households (a sizable number of 
them lying above the poverty line) joined in this microfinance programme. Though the size of 
the group is small, the rate of interest charged against microcredit is comparatively low (12% per 
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annum) and the repayment rate within the group is very high (near about 98%) because of peer 
pressure and group dynamics, there has been no significant impact on the standard of living of 
rural people after joining microfinance programme through forming Self-help group under 
Primary Agricultural Credit Society. This is reflected as there is no significant change in the 
monthly income and monthly adult equivalent per-capita consumption expenditure of the 
respondent households belonging to treatment group within the concerned time period. Lack of 
proper initiative for investment in income- generating activity because of lack of skill-based 
training programme is one of the main causes of it. The marginal farmers are also not so much 
willing to take loan for agricultural purposes as the return is uncertain in nature. The only 
positive aspect is that the members can protect themselves from the clutches of professional 
money lenders. 
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End Notes: 
                                                            
i Small size of the group can automatically reduce the possibility of coordination failure among 
the group members which can also reduce the possibility of default. 
 
ii In the Government of India supported micro credit programme under SGSY scheme the rate of 
interest charged against credit is 24% per annum. 
iii So to do the impact study, we consider the time gap of four years. 
iv Following Townsend (1994) to get adult equivalent family members we have considered 1 for 
any adult member (both male and female), 0.25 for any member of that household up to six years 
of age and 0.5 for any member of the household between six and fourteen years of age and 0.75 
between fourteen and eighteen years of age. During the time of calculating Dependency Ratio we 
have calculated that in terms of adult equivalence 
 
v During the time of incorporating earnings of a rural household from NREGA, we have to 
consider the total earnings of that sample household under NREGA between Septembers -
December 2007 to September-December 2008 which indicates that the reference period is here 
last one year.  
vi A good number of sample households own the size of landholdings around 1 bigha or 0.33 
acres or less. The entire yield from land is used for self-consumption which indicates zero 
marketable surpluses. They prefer not to take loan for cultivation under joint liability micro 
credit system operated by PACS because repayment might become a problem as no extra income 
is generated from production of crops. So 43 out of total 90 sample respondents possesses land 
less than 1 acres and 30 out of 40 sample respondents possesses land between 1 acre to 2.5 acres 
took loan from their respective group for agricultural purposes between the concerned time 
period. Actually the marketable surpluses of the second category of respondent households are 
not zero and they have few extra earnings which can help them to replay their credit. The 
remaining two members with ownership of land more than 2.5 acres took credit for cultivation 
from their respective groups. Thus even though 130 respondents possess land, yet only 75 of 
them availed loan facilities for cultivation through joint liability loan contract system operated by 
PACS in 2008.  We have found identical picture in NSSO (59th round, 2005) report where it was 
observed that there is substantial differences between marginal / semi marginal farmers and other 
farmer households regarding the purpose for which loan is obtained for. It was noted that the 
share of consumption loan is higher among the marginal and sub-marginal farmer households. In 
West Bengal the proportion of credit among those households for production purposes is 49.8% 
and for non-production purposes that is 50.2%.          
vii Total number of respondents who took credit both for income generating activities as well as 
non-income generating activities between the concerned time periods is 35. But one can take 
credit only after repaying the previous one. As the group size is small and size of credit is not so 
large, few members took loan more than once.   
 
viii Very low value of Rଶതതത is not important in this type of econometric study for natural experiment. 
The required parameter estimate is insignificant and most of the remaining explanatory variables 
are also insignificant.   
